Oaf Definition Military - Now, we are pleased to present one of the essays selected for Honorable Mention from Zahara Maticek of Northwestern University and Ian Bertram of the US Air Force Command and Staff College.
Conventional warfare is officially dead. This has become a prominent trend in which numerous adversaries are engaging the American military and its allies in unconventional ways. The long-term concept of a decisive battle pitting the fighting forces of two nations against each other for a victorious slugfest is in the next tomb. Even fake wars, modeled on the American Civil War, World War I and World War II, and Korea are gone. If America hopes to remain strategically relevant, its political and military leadership must adapt to the new reality that no adversary wants to fight the United States conventionally.
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It's tough for the US military, but there finally seems to be an awakening. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Vincent R. Stewart (US Marine Corps), recently lamented the submission of America's military power to the Senate Armed Services Committee:
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Lt. J. Vincent Stewart testifies at an open hearing of the House Intelligence Committee (Selection) on September 10, 2015 (Chip Somodevilla/Getty)
Adversaries have studied America's methods of conflict and have developed and will continue to develop capabilities to undermine or directly challenge US military dominance in all areas of warfare... and have co-compulsions available to them in advancing regional agendas, with judicious or determined use of military force. Acts as an amplifier that allows all these state efforts to continue -Ans.
The apparent exclusion of the military from the tools available to influence and coerce the pursuit of General Stewart's regional agenda is an example of the fact that adversaries do not use military force first. Instead, adversaries use military force as an amplifier of entire state efforts. Translated into layman's terms, adversaries no longer rely on conventional military power—only, initially or suddenly—to pursue narrow political goals in their spheres of influence. Therefore, no country close to its peers openly challenges the rules, norms, and institutions of the American world order built through decades of American blood, sweat, and tears. Such enemies are working in a marginal and indirect way to obtain limited benefits that suit their own interests. These efforts skew America's strategic interests in such a way that it is difficult for political and military leaders to justify countering and/or reversing America's political will and military resources.
Indeed, U.S. strategy is caught in a paradoxical situation where the conventional concept of war is required for total deterrence, but is dead because an adversary does not want to directly engage America's conventional military power. Moreover, the mandate for what the US and its allies believe to be conventional warfare is an illusion. As a theoretical construct, current warfare depends historically on time and context, as Clausewitz states, and it determines how major political powers recognize the best and most effective form of warfare. A regional war based on mobility, a form in which the United States has excelled and dominated. No country wants to use its military so brazenly against the United States anymore. From this perspective, it should not be surprising that potential adversaries are trying to circumvent America's hegemonic position – or at least the perception of hegemony – of America's military power through entirely indirect non-military measures. Such actions tend to shape narratives and attitudes, making it difficult for the United States to respond appropriately.
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As a theoretical construct, conventional warfare depends historically on time and context, as Clausewitz states, and determines how major political powers agree on the best and most effective methods of warfare.
In addition, the United States and its allies face the problem of how to transform the concept of war in the 21st century, as most adversaries engage in limited activities to undermine American influence and power and undermine US rhetoric. It effectively undermines the concept of US military power, making it largely irrelevant in stopping the pursuit of political goals by Russia, China and others. It's almost as if the paradox of Edward Luttwak's strategy is emerging empirically now that America's greatest power—current military dominance in the land, sea, and air domains—has been chipped away at by state actors. A wooden giant that lacks the flexibility, strength, or long-term will to deal with terrorists, terrorists, and gray-zone conflicts initiated by states near its peers.
The perception of Americans' lack of will to deploy their military is not just a contemporary problem. In 1950, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave the infamous Perimeter speech, in which he referred to the defense of the Pacific without mentioning Korea. The government was on the verge of defeat when the United States intervened with a large UN military force. Ultimately the disastrous US-led intervention re-established the 38th parallel political border between the two states. Begins when two countries disagree. on their relative strengths, and wars usually end only when nations agree to fight on their relative strengths.” [5] Since the end of the Cold War, America has had almost no direct confrontation with conventional weapons. Country 1990s. Still, the butchers of Baghdad did not embrace American military might; Rather, he misjudged America's political will.
By 1990, Hussein was the George H.W. His invasion of Kuwait was accepted by the Bush administration. It was based on a meeting with the American ambassador to Iraq, April C. Glaspie, in which he said, "We have no idea about an Arab-Arab conflict like your disagreement with Kuwait." Kuwait, looting its capital city. But within a year, Hussein's forces were driven out of Kuwait and defeated in a US-led ground campaign that lasted only 100 hours. The actual American military response occurred because Bush believed that tolerating Hussein's actions would make him a modern-day Neville Chamberlain attacking a modern-day Hitler at the new Munich Conference.
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In 2003, Hussain believed that the US military threat was not due to confidence in his own military power, but rather because he believed that the George W. Bush administration lacked political strength. Hussein believed that the Bush administration "wouldn't go to war because it would be too expensive for the Americans." ” During this time, the Bush administration viewed the Iraqi state as a terrorist state and was intent on the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, which significantly changed the US political calculus. Within three weeks of the ground war, the Iraqi government and military collapsed, and the major combat operation ended four weeks later. Therefore, opposition to American military power is not based on concepts of relative strength, but rather on (mis)calculations of US political intent to wage war.
... Opposition to American military power is based not on concepts of relative strength, but on (mis)calculations of the political will of the United States to wage war.
Even the Taliban believed it could ultimately involve NATO/ISAF forces in a conventional war to undermine Western credibility and a political solution. During Operation Medusa in September 2006, the Taliban launched a regular offensive against NATO/ISAF troops in the Panjwai region, which was "related to the Vietcong Tet Offensive of 1968...Taliban forces attempted to execute to hold ground." [9] ] Although the Taliban were ultimately defeated, it was "an emotional victory for NATO/ISAF, as the Taliban changed their tactics and strategies to those of a classic Maoist insurgency. The Taliban problem confounded American strategists and America's resolve (or lack thereof) ) continues to be due to Taliban assessments, including local Afghan opinion. Fundamentally, the Taliban understand the time horizon; they know they can ignore US military firepower in the short term and wait for American political will in the long term.
In each instance, the adversaries made a political mistake regarding normal military communications with the US armed forces (and allies) and were easily led. The only difference with the Taliban is that they have figured out how to bypass American efforts to project power outside the big cities, because they understand that SA's policy exceeds the amount of support and schedule. Therefore, they can rely on local communities outside the cities to support them, as Kabul cannot project state power there and the West's long-term security commitments are in serious doubt. The Taliban understand that the Afghan Marshall Plan will never happen, because no American politician (or Western leader) is willing to make such a commitment. Such American strategic allegiance allows the Taliban to make side deals with warlords and empty tribal leaders, as nothing more than an invisible effort to undermine America's commitment to the country, and at best a half-hearted attempt to defeat the Taliban. Worse, efforts to rely on long-term drone strikes to keep the Taliban in check will not cure the underlying factors and structural conditions that allowed their insurgency.
Today, We Lost An American Hero: Medal Of Honor Recipient, Green Beret 18d Staff Sgt. Ron Shurer Ii Dies At 41 After A Battle With Lung Cancer.
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